Janus: a Playground for User-Involved Agentic Permission Management
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Introduction to the show: ident: AI Radio. Generated commentary on the latest Artificial Intelligence papers.
Tom: We're looking at the paper: "Janus: a Playground for User-Involved Agentic Permission Management".
Jane: Here's the gist of the paper. The gist The authors introduce Janus, a playground system for implementing and evaluating user-involved agentic permission management designs to explore how different approaches affect usability and efficacy in preventing adversarial or inappropriate tool calls.
Tom: Conceptual Model The conceptual model articulates a framework for describing, reasoning about, and comparing different permission management approaches in agentic systems <ref:2607.01510#pg4>.
Jane: It describes the flow where the user supplies tasks to be completed, the agent determines actions like tool calls or responses, and a permission management module decides whether a tool call is permitted or not <ref:2607.01510#pg4>.
Tom: The control flows as follows: 1) The user sends a message to the agent (e.g., “Schedule a meeting today with Joe”).
Paper summary: Tom: So, we’re talking about the Janus paper again. We just covered that it introduces this playground system to test different ways users can get involved in controlling an AI agent's tool calls.
Jane: That’s right. The authors set up this modular system called Janus-Core for the agent and Janus-Harness for the evaluation framework, which lets them compare these different permission management designs side by side.
Lu: They built Janus-Core to be modular, breaking the permission management component into two pieces: one part that checks calls against fixed rules, and another part called the permission assistant that handles things beyond those fixed rules.
Meng: So, they have a policy manager for the static stuff and then this separate assistant layer for when things get tricky? What does that mean for actual running a model?
Tom: It means when an agent suggests a tool call, first the policy manager deterministically checks it against the static rules, and if no rule allows it, then they invoke that permission assistant.
Jane: And they implemented six different permission assistants to represent different points in this design space. They have risk assessment, auto approve, user confirmation—you name it.
Lu: Those six assistants span the key design axes we talked about earlier: persistent policies, the level of autonomy of the agent, and how much user involvement there is at runtime.
Meng: I wonder how they handle scaling this up to real traffic? Is running this whole system too heavy for production?
Tom: They focused on making it modular so you can swap out those assistants easily, and they output detailed logs of all interactions between the modules to let you analyze each assistant individually.
Jane: They then used Janus-Harness with three scenarios—personal email triage, calendar management, and team collaboration—and tested them against synthetic responders.
Lu: The synthetic responders are really smart because they simulate user behavior; they can be always yes, always no, or alignment aware of the user’s intent.
Meng: So it’s not just running a test script; they are simulating real users reacting in different ways to the AI's requests? That sounds more realistic for deployment concerns.
Tom: Exactly. It lets them see how different combinations of the agent's behavior and the user's reaction affect whether a tool call gets executed or blocked.
Jane: The paper’s main contribution is demonstrating that user involvement is critical for privacy and security, even when we’re using AI to augment those decisions.
Lu: They show that while AI can help reduce cognitive load, it doesn't replace the need for careful permission management strategies guided by user input.
Meng: So the message is that you can’t just blindly let an agent run freely; you have to build in these checkpoints where a human, or a policy mechanism driven by human intent, gets involved.
Tom: That’s the gist of it—it’s not about replacing the agent entirely, but building smart guardrails around its actions based on user context and input.
Conclusion: Tom: So wrapping up the Janus paper, we have a system called Janus that lets us play around with different ways users can manage permissions for agents.
Jane: It’s a playground, which means it lets researchers test out six different permission assistant designs across various user involvement levels and scenarios to see what works best.
Lu: The authors highlight that the key finding is that user input is critical; it can seriously boost privacy and security while also helping AI augment those decisions by lowering the cognitive load.
Meng: So for us in production, it’s a reminder that we need to consider not just the technical safety of the agent, but how user-facing controls affect usability and fatigue.
Tom: Right. And they emphasize that designers should look at both the potential attack rates and how often those bad calls happen, plus the interactions between a permission assistant and the actual user.
Jane: They conclude that effective permission management has to be context-based design, because what you accept in terms of uncertainty depends deeply on the application's domain and its specific risks.
Lu: The paper provides a foundation for designing user studies where you can actually test specific hypotheses about permission management by using Janus’s framework and scenarios.
Meng: It’s a useful tool for testing ideas, but the authors also flag that the combination of their designs and user behaviors could result in blocking the execution of tool calls that we actually want to happen.
Tom: So they are saying that there's a trade-off between security and functionality, and we need to figure out where that balance lands for any given application.
Natalie Grace Brigham, Eugene Bagdasarian, Tadayoshi Kohno, Franziska Roesner
University of Washington · University of Massachusetts Amherst · Georgetown University
cs.AI, cs.CR
Submitted: 2026-07-01
Updated: 2026-10-17
Comments: To appear in 48th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2027)
Code: https://github.com/GraceBrigham/Janus
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Importance score: 88/100
The gist: The gist The authors introduce Janus, a playground system for implementing and evaluating user-involved agentic permission management designs to explore how different approaches affect usability and
Key concepts
- Conceptual Model
- This model describes the agent's flow: the user gives a task, the agent plans actions like tool calls, and a permission module decides if those calls are allowed. It shows how user input fits into this cycle to control what actions are taken.
- Design Axes for Permission Management
- These are key dimensions used to categorize different permission systems. They include using fixed rules (persistent policies), the agent's autonomy, the level of user involvement during setup or runtime, and how data is used to make decisions.
- Permission Assistant Implementations
- These are specific ways a system can ask for or manage permissions. Examples include risk assessment (using an LLM to judge danger), auto-approval, requiring explicit user confirmation before every action, and providing suggestions for new rules.
Terminology
Summary
The gist The authors introduce Janus, a playground system for implementing and evaluating user-involved agentic permission management designs to explore how different approaches affect usability and efficacy in preventing adversarial or inappropriate tool calls.
Conceptual Model
The conceptual model articulates a framework for describing, reasoning about, and comparing different permission management approaches in agentic systems <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. It describes the flow where the user supplies tasks to be completed, the agent determines actions like tool calls or responses, and a permission management module decides whether a tool call is permitted or not <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. The control flows as follows: 1) The user sends a message to the agent (e.g., “Schedule a meeting today with Joe”). 2) The agent determines what actions to take (e.g., make tool calls to check Joe’s availability and create a calendar event). 3) For each tool call made, the permission management module decides whether to approve or reject it, potentially consulting the user or applying persistent policies <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. 4) If approved through the permission management module, the tool call is executed, potentially operating on the user’s data <ref:2607.01510#pg4>.
Design Axes for Permission Management
The Janus-Core design supports a broad spectrum of approaches by identifying key dimensions along which permission management can vary <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. These axes include: 1) Persistent policies, which leverage persistent global policies
<ref:2607.01510#pg4>. 2) Ability to act beyond persistent policies, concerning how autonomously agents can act on the user’s behalf <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. 3) Level of user involvement, which varies during configuration and at runtime <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. 4) Grounding, describing what data is drawn on to make decisions, such as using an LLM to assess sensitivity based on the user’s prompted task <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. The paper notes that no single design performs perfectly across all contexts
<ref:2607.01510#pg4>.
Janus-Core Implementation
Janus-Core is designed to be modular, flexible, and instrumented for evaluation <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. It decomposes the permission management component into two modular, interconnected components: (1) the policy manager evaluates tool calls against deterministic, rule-based policies and (2) the permission assistant handles permission management capabilities beyond those of the policy manager <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. The agent follows a standard observe-plan-act loop <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. When the agent proposes a tool call, the policy manager deterministically evaluates it against the static policy set and returns an allow/deny decision <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. If no policy approves, it invokes the permission assistant <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. The system outputs detailed logs of all between-module interactions to facilitate analyses of individual permission assistants and comparisons between them <ref:2607.01510#pg5>.
Permission Assistant Implementations
The paper implements six permission assistants to represent diverse points in the design space <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. These include: 1) risk assessment, which uses a judge LLM to assess how “risky” the tool call is and escalates if the risk judgment exceeds a threshold <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. 2) risk assessment autonomous, which allows the tool call if the score is at or below a configurable tolerance <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. 3) auto approve, which is equivalent to the base/naive case where the permission assistant will automatically approve all tool calls <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. 4) user confirmation, which escalates every tool call to the user asking for allow or deny <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. 5) constitution, which compiles a plain-English constitution file into ordered JSON rules and uses first-match rule evaluation <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. 6) policy suggestion, which provides the user with the option to reject tool calls or generate a new persistent policy for similar actions <ref:2607.01510#pg5>.
Janus-Harness Evaluation Framework
Janus-Harness is an evaluation infrastructure designed around Janus-Core to facilitate automated analysis of different permission assistant designs under a diversity of usage scenarios <ref:2607.01510#pg6>. Its design goals include being automatable, supporting user-driven scenarios, and specifying a “ground truth” for the “user’s” intent <ref:2607.01510#pg6>. Janus-Harness supports synthetic responders to simulate user behavior <ref:2607.01510#pg6>. Scenarios are designed across three contexts: (1) personal email triage, (2) calendar management, and (3) team collaboration <ref:2607.01510#pg9>. Each scenario has a clear ground truth for the correct permission management decision <ref:2607.01510#pg9>.
Experimental Results and Takeaways
Experiments involved running a full factorial experiment with Janus-Harness (3 scenarios × 4 subscenarios × 3 synthetic responders) five times for each permission assistant <ref:2607.01510#pg10>. The results highlighted that user input is critical and can significantly strengthen privacy and security while at the same time AI augmentation of user decisions can help reduce cognitive load
<ref:2607.01510#pg10>. A key takeaway is that designers should consider both (1) the attack and out-of-alignment tool call rates and (2) the interactions between a permission assistant and a user <ref:2607.01510#pg10>. Designers should strive to minimize—ideally reduce to zero—the number of attack or out-of-alignment tool calls that occur for always no synthetic responders <ref:2607.01510#pg10>. Furthermore, designers should strive for permission assistants that (2) automatically reject all attack or out-of-alignment tool calls and (3) have user interfaces that minimize the likelihood of users granting incorrect permissions when not automatically rejected by the permission assistant <ref:2607.01510#pg10>. Finally, designers should recognize that "locally-correct user responses to permission requests (e.g., the alignment-aware approval of a policy) may result in subsequent incorrect decisions (e.g., the subsequent automatic approval of an attack or out-ofalignment tool call)" <ref:2607.01510#pg10>.
Discussion and Conclusion
Janus enables experimentation with and evaluation of diverse approaches to user-involved runtime permission management for agentic systems <ref:2607.01510#pg8>. The work provides a foundation for designing user studies by using Janus’s framework and scenarios to test specific hypotheses about permission management <ref:2607.01510#pg8>. Effective permission management requires context-based design and evaluations, as Consider how much uncertainty users are willing to accept, and at what cost for usability and security, depends deeply on the application’s domain and risks
<ref:2607.01510#pg8>. The findings suggest that designers should recognize that the combination of their designs and user behaviors could result in the blocking of the execution of desired (non-attack, non-out-of-alignment) tool calls
<ref:2607.01510#pg10>. Future work could expand Janus to address greater complexity, such as multi-agent interactions and more nuanced use of chat context <ref:2607.01510#pg8>.
How it works
The system is built around the observation-plan-act loop <ref:2607.01510#pg4>. A tool call is blocked until approved by the policy manager or permission assistant <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. If denied, the agent continues without the result and may retry the same call <ref:2607.01510#pg5>. The permission assistant interfaces with multi-turn user interaction and has access to the user’s most recent messages for context <ref:2607.01510#pg5>.
Scenarios and Responders
Janus-Harness supports synthetic responders, which include three deterministic modes: always yes,
always no,
and alignment aware
<ref:2607.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Develop a modular permission management component that decomposes decision-making into a policy manager for deterministic rules and a permission assistant for dynamic decisions, allowing researchers to choose between them based on whether an approach
leverages basic, deterministic policies
orleverages more complex policies internally.
-
Implement risk assessment assistants that use judge LLMs to score tool call risk against user tasks, allowing the system to either escalate requests if the judgment exceeds a threshold or approve calls autonomously if the risk is below tolerance.
-
Create a constitution assistant that compiles plain-English rules into ordered JSON rules using an LLM, applying first-match rule evaluation for tool calls and intent-matching auto-approver for unlisted actions, serving as an example of a permission assistant with internal persistent policy management.
-
Develop a policy suggestion assistant that interfaces with the Janus Core policy manager to propose generalized policies based on user feedback, allowing users to
propose a generalized policy (name, description, and parameter-based conditions), shows it to the user, and lets them accept, revise, or reject.
-
Design an evaluation framework that uses synthetic responders like
always yes,
always no,
andalignment aware
to systematically test permission assistants across personal email triage, calendar management, and team collaboration scenarios. -
Create a scenario configuration system where users can define the
ground truth
for intent, including specific tool calls designated as attack calls or out-of-alignment tool calls to stress-test different permission management designs. -
Design a policy suggestion mechanism that recognizes "locally-correct user responses to permission requests (e.g., the alignment-aware approval of a policy) may result in subsequent incorrect decisions (e.g., the subsequent automatic approval of an attack or out-ofalignment tool call)."
-
Implement logging and traceability infrastructure within Janus Core that records
detailed logs of all between-module interactions, thereby facilitating analyses of individual permission assistants and comparisons between permission assistants.
Abstract
AI agents that autonomously execute tool calls on a user's behalf raise pressing questions about permission management: what role could users play, and what role should they play? Despite many proposed approaches, the user's role in agentic permission management remains underexplored. We introduce Janus, a playground system for implementing and evaluating user-involved agentic permission management designs. Janus consists of two components: Janus-Core, a modular agentic system supporting a diverse spectrum of permission management designs, and Janus-Harness, an automated evaluation framework. Grounded in a conceptual model that identifies key design axes for user involvement, we implement six permission assistants spanning the design space and evaluate them across three scenarios with four subscenarios each and three synthetic responders. We demonstrate that user involvement is critical and can strengthen privacy and security and that user behavior such as permission fatigue must be accounted for in system design. No single design performs optimally across all contexts, motivating a more principled and context-sensitive approach to deploying permission assistants in agentic systems. Janus is publicly available to support future investigation into this dimension of agentic system design.
Sources
- Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections
- AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injections
- Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control
- Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problem
- Systems Security Foundations for Agentic Computing
- Secure and Efficient Access Control for Computer-Use Agents via Context Space
- Formal Policy Enforcement for Agentic Systems
- CaMeLs Can Use Computers Too: System-level Security for Computer Use Agents
- When Bots Take the Bait: Exposing and Mitigating the Emerging Social Engineering Attack in Web Automation Agent
- AC4A: Access Control for Agents
- Evolution of Android's Permission-based Security Model and Challenges
- Sketch-based Access Control: A Multimodal Interface for Translating User Preferences into Intent-Aligned Policies
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