Calibrated Decision Models for Autonomous Penetration-Testing Harnesses: JEV and Laya as System One Decision Layers for LLM-Driven Pentest Agents
cs.CR, cs.AI, cs.SE
Submitted: 2026-09-24
Updated: 2026-09-24
Comments: 21 pages, 5 figures, 11 tables, 4 code listings
Code: https://github.com/JoasASantos/NeuroSploit
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Autonomous penetration-testing harnesses use large language models (LLMs) for reconnaissance, exploitation, and reporting, but often rely on those same models to confirm findings, grade severity, and
Terminology
Abstract
Autonomous penetration-testing harnesses use large language models (LLMs) for reconnaissance, exploitation, and reporting, but often rely on those same models to confirm findings, grade severity, and select agents. This can lead to false positives, inflated severity, and wasted compute. We examine how System One decision models, lightweight non-generative classifiers that return typed, calibrated verdicts, can support these decisions. We make five contributions. First, we define four decision points: finding adjudication, severity recalibration, agent pruning, and confirmation loops. Second, we present an exploratory NeuroSploit case study comparing one run with TypeSafe System One (Jev) and one without it against a web target containing 13 vulnerabilities. Differences in severity distribution, runtime, and grading by exposed data type motivate the architecture but do not establish statistical significance. Third, we review published specifications for Jev, Jev-Ultrafast, and the open-source Laya without assuming that results from other benchmarks transfer to penetration testing. Fourth, we discuss RLHF, RLAIF, RLCD, and RLHV as training approaches and their implications for trust in security decisions. Finally, we propose Rave, a domain-adapted System One model, and outline its training data, evaluation protocol, and potential effect on harness assurance.
Sources
- From Capability to Assurance in Autonomous Penetration-Testing Harnesses: A Framework and Reference Implementation
- Multi-Agent Penetration Testing AI for the Web
- Baselines Before Architecture: Evaluating Coding Agents for Autonomous Penetration Testing
- Cybersecurity AI: The Dangerous Gap Between Automation and Autonomy
- The Role of AI in Modern Penetration Testing
- Penetration Testing of Agentic AI: A Comparative Security Analysis Across Models and Frameworks
- JEV-as-a-Judge: Accept When Confident, Escalate When Unsure
- REFLEX with Jev for Efficient Selective Control in LLM Agents
- Jev for Scientific Decisions: Evaluating Semantic Choices and Their Consequences
- Jev-Mem: System-One-Controlled Agentic Memory for Efficient AI Agents
- Calibrated Decisions at Scale: Converting Police Crash Narratives into Probabilistic Crash Variables with a System One Model (Jev)
- LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities
- Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models
- Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback
- Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
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