From Sandbox to Enforcement: Confidence-Qualified Threat Intelligence for Critical Infrastructure
cs.CR, cs.AI
Submitted: 2026-10-05
Updated: 2026-10-05
Comments: 20 pages, 3 figures. Accepted at the 21st International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2026)
Code: https://github.com/idaholab/cape2stix
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: Security operations centres and national incident-response teams defending critical infrastructure collect abundant threat data yet struggle to turn it into actionable intelligence.
Abstract
Security operations centres and national incident-response teams defending critical infrastructure collect abundant threat data yet struggle to turn it into actionable intelligence. A malware sandbox produces detailed behavioural evidence, but as a large, unranked report whose confidence is unstated. We present CG-CTI, an operational pipeline that converts live sandbox output (CAPEv2) into STIX 2.1, correlates it in a knowledge graph with other critical-infrastructure sensors, and attaches to every intelligence object an explicit confidence status derived from provenance, cross-source corroboration, and observation durability. This status gates automated action: only corroborated intelligence is eligible for automated enforcement, while lower-confidence objects are routed to analyst review or kept as context. A grounded language-model stage then narrates the confidence-qualified evidence, where each statement either cites a supporting object or is marked unsupported, so fabricated references are removed before analyst review. We implement CG-CTI within the CYBERGUARD project, whose consortium includes Romania's national cyber-security directorate, and evaluate it against the live sandbox on a labelled malware corpus, measuring conversion validity, indicator yield, technique coverage, corroboration, enforcement eligibility, latency, and summary grounding. CG-CTI turns fragmented sandbox output into corroborated, confidence-ranked, and auditable intelligence for critical-infrastructure defence.
Sources
- Decaying Indicators of Compromise
- Uncovering Vulnerabilities of LLM-Assisted Cyber Threat Intelligence
- Qwen2.5 Technical Report
- SaMOSA: Sandbox for Malware Orchestration and Side-Channel Analysis
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